Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Wayne Pearce v. Martin J. Wistisen and Richard
Oveson : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard and D. David Lambert; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Darwin C. Hansen; Hansen & Spratley; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pearce v. Wistisen, No. 18376 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3089

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

••

WAYNE PEARCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

••

vs.

••

MARTIN J. WISTISEN and
RICHARD OVESON,

Case No. 18,376

••

••

Defendants-Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH
COUNTY, HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSEN PRESIDING

JACKSON HOWARD and
D. DAVID LAMBERT, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
DARWIN c. HANSEN, for:
HANSEN, CRIST & SPRATLEY
110 West Center Street
P.O. Box 489
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents

F~

11
1~

i~

'..f•'l'""T'>

r

\~
·1

t>-'i:

n
~~--$./~,

SEP 3 0 1982
~111••.,,=-••w-•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.... - __ .., _,..__ - -- - - - - - - - .,.•••••~

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.•

WAYNE PEARCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
MARTIN J. WISTISEN and
RICHARD OVESON,
Defendants-Respo~dents.

••

.•
.•

Case No. 18,376

••

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

.

~·-

'

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH
COUNTY, HONORABLE ALLEN B. SORENSEN PRESIDING

JACKSON HOWARD and
D. DAVID LAMBERT, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
DARHIN c. HANSEN, for:
HANSEN, CRIST & SPRATLEY
110 West Center Street
P.O. Box 489
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iii

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED

INSTRUCTION NO. 6 ON IMPUTED LIABILITY UNDER UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED §73-18-18 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR •••••••• 1
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE
ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING ALCOHOL
CONSUMPTION BY THE DECEASED, EVAN PEARCE ••••••••••••• 5
POINT III
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 REGARDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT
EVAN PEARCE WAS EXERCISING DUE CARE FOR HIS OWN
SAFETY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8
POINT IV
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS
TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF ANY ANCHOR ABOARD
THE BOAT IN ISSUE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR ••••••••••••••• 12
CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED:

Page

Back v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 117
(6th Cir. 1974) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..••• 5, 6, 15
Haman v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 91 Idaho 19
415 P.2d 305 (1966) ••••••••••••••.••••••.••••..•.•••. 11
State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442 291 P.2d 1093

(1971) ••• 1, 2

Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981) ••••••••••.•••• 4
Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967) ••.•• 13, 14, 16

STATUTES AND MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITY

Page
Utah Code Ann. §73-18-8 (1980) ••••••••••.•••••••••••••••• 12, 15, 16
Utah Code Ann. §73-18-18 (1980) ••.••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
4 u ta h Adm in. R. §A 60-01- 3 ( 3 ) ( b ) ( 12 ) ( 19 7 5 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12 , 16

57 Am. Jr. 2d Negligence §160 at p. 522 (1971) ••••••••••• 9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

IN THE SUPREME·COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.

WAYNE PEARCE,

.

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

MARTIN J. WISTISEN and
RICHARD OVESON,
Defendants-Respondents.

.
.
.

Case No. 18,376

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 ON IMPUTED LIABILITY UNDER UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED §73-18-18 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 291 P.2d 1093, 1095
(1971), the Court states the general rule that:
A refusal to give an instruction cannot be
the basis for reversal, unless the jury was
insufficiently advised of the issue they were
to determine, or it appears that they were
confused or misled to the prejudice of the
person complaining.
491 P.2d at 1095.

(Emphasis added).

Plaintiff agrees with the rule as stated, but as to the
instant action, plaintiff asserts that the exceptions outlined

iri the rule and emphasized above are applicable and controlling
in the instant case.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 was the only instruction which would have given the jury an understanding of the law
on vicarious liability as set out in Utah Code Ann. §73-18-18. No
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instruction given by the Court conveyed any notion whatsoever of
the statutory vicarious liability of the defendants for the
negligent acts of Kevin Histisen.
In the absence of such an instruction it is clear that the
jury was insufficiently advised as to the law on vicarous liability which was a key issue for the jury's determination.

As a

consequence, the verdict was the product of a confused and misled
jury, which resulted in substantial prejudice to the plaintiff.
Based on the authority of Ouzounian, the Court's failure to give
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 is a basis for reversal.
Defendants' assertion that the Court's Instruction No. 5 was
an adequate substitution for Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
No. 6 completely misses the central issue in dispute.

The

Court's Instruction No. 5 states:
In this case the plaintiff has the burden of
persuading you that the defendants Martin J.
Wistisen and/or Richard Oveson and/or the
boat operator Kevin Wistisen was negligent
and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of the death of Evan Pearce.
The above cited instruction informs the jury only that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that one or both of the defendants,
or Kevin Wistisen was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Evan Pearce.

Nowhere in the

instruction is found the least indication that the negligence of
Kevin Histisen was to be imputed by law to the defendants.
Nowhere in the instruction is found any explanation concerning
the relevance of the negligence of a non-party.

The fact that

the jury found the defendants to be negligent in no way demonstrates that the jury found said negligence by imputing the

-2-
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negligence of Kevin \listisen.

There is no way in which the jury

could have extracted the notion of vicarious liability from the
instructions they received.
Absent an adequate instruction on imputed liability, the
Jury could easily have found, as they did, that the negligence of

the named defendants was not the proximate cause of the death of
Evan Pearce.

It is obvious that the lack of instruction con-

cerning the imputability and relevance of Kevin Wistisen's
negligence created confusion in the jury and prduced error so
substantial as to require reversal.
Defendants have suggested that it is the Court's failure to
mention the term ''vicarious liability" that is the chief concern
of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff is little concerned whether the

words "vicarious liability" were used in the instruction, as long
as the instruction conveyed the concept of the vicarious liability doctrine.

Such was not the case. No substantive communica-

tion of the doctrine was ever made to the jury in the Court's
instructions, not even implicitly.

Defendants have repeatedly

stated that since the Court's instruction concerned the negligence of both defendants and Kevin Wistisen, the plaintiff's
request for a vicarious liability instruction was satisfied.
Defendants apparently misunderstand the vicarious liability
doctrine.

The point is not that the negligence of Kevin Wistisen

is involved, but that it be imputed to defendants.

In light of

the fact that not even the most vague notion of the vicarious
liability doctrine was presented to the jury, plaintiff's request
for reversal on this point is indeed one of "substance" rather
than "one of form only" as asserted by defendants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendants rely on the case of Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d
455 (Utah 1981), and cite the following language therefrom:
Nevertheless, the court cannot be said to
have failed to properly instruct the jury
when requested instructions are fully
covered in other instructions given.
626 P.2d at 458-459.

(Emphasis added).

The. language of Watters

clearly indicates that when requested instructions are not fully
covered in other instructions, the court has failed to properly
instruct the jury.

This is exactly what occurred in the instant

case and, therefore, reversible error was committed by the trial
court.
Defendants' brief further argues that since the jury ·found
both defendants and Kevin Wistisen negligent that "appellant received the finding of negligence which he
have misunderstood plaintiff's case.

~ought."

Defendant~

Plaintiff's-purpose in re-

questing their proposed Instruction No. 6 was not to show that
Kevin Wistisen and the two named defendants were independently
negligent, but rather to show that Kevin Wistisen's negligence
was imputable by law to the named defendants.

In view of the

fact that Kevin Wistisen is not a defendant to this action, a
finding of negligence on his part is absolutely useless to plaintiff's case unless the jury were to understand that Kevin
Wistisen's negligence was to be imputed to the two named defendants.

Since not one scintilla of imputed or vicarious liability

doctrine \las present in any of the Court's instructions, the jury
could not have found the named defendants liable for the negligence of Kevin Wistisen.

Absent an adequate instruction by the

Court on vicarious liability the plaintiff did not and could not
have received the finding of negligence which he sought.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Based on the authority and analysis above, plaintiff's case
was substantially prejudiced by the Court's failure to give his
Requested Instruction No. 6 and said refusal by the Court requires
reversal of the trial court's verdict.
POINT I I
THE PLAINTIFF WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE
ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING ALCOHOL
CONSUMPTION BY THE DECEASED, EVAN PEARCE.
Plaintiff has asserted, ever since he learned of defendants'
intentions to introduce evidence at trial concerning the illegal
purchase and consumption of alcohol by Evan Pearce, that such
evidence would be prejudicial and inflammatory.

Although defen-

dants conceded to the trial court that they could not prove how
much alcohol the deceased, Evan Pearce, had consumed, or that he
was ever intoxicated, defendants were intent on introducing such
evidence to inflame the jury and prejudice them against the young
man.
Defendants assert that they were entitled to introduce the
evidence as rebuttal, stating that plaintiff brought up the
matter first.

(Brief of Respondents at 18-19).

is grossly false.

This assertion

Defendants presented both the purchase and

consumption of the alcohol to the jury in their opening statement
to the jury.

(R. at 285.)

This was clearly not by way of

rebuttal, but rather, was the primary and principal means by
which the jury was exposed to this prejudicial and inflammatory
evidence.
The defendants discussion of Bach v. Penn_ Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 {6th Cir. 1974) fails to recognize the
import of Bach.

While it is true that Bach states the general

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rule that evidence of drinking before a fatal accident is generally relevant to the jury's consideration of contributory negligence, the holding in Bach carves out a major exception to that
general rule which is directly applicable in the instant case.
The court in Bach held, with respect to the introduction of
evidence that alcohol consumed prior to-a fatal accident:
[T]he relevance of such evidence disappears
if the drinking occurred so long before the
accident that the alcohol could no longer
have any effect on the decedent's conduct.
The probative. value of such evidence must be
closely scrutinized to avoid the p6ssibility
of prejudice to the party charged with
negligence • • • This evidence was much too
remote and uncertain to be of effective
probative value on this issue of contributory
negligence.
502 F.2d at 1121 (emphasis added).
In the instant case the court failed to closely scrutinize
the probative value of the evidence of prior consumption of
alcohol by Evan Pearce.

The court failed to consider that any

consumption of alcohol did not contribute to the creation of the
predicament in which Evan Pearce was placed.

The court failed to

consider that there was no expert testimony of any kind which
would have tended to show that Evan Pearce was being affected by
alcohol in his system or by the after effects of alcohol which
had been in his system.

The court failed to consider that the

testimony of Rod Hunt could not quantify the alcohol consumed by
Evan Pearce in any way save to say that he was "involved'' (R. at
295) in the activity of drinking while at the party.

The court

failed to consider that the illegal purchase of the alcohol by
Evan Pearce was completely irrelevant to his condition at the
time of the incident in question.
-6-
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The argument forwarded by the defendants with respect to the
Bach case is that the drinking in the Bach case may have been
more remote in time than the drinking in the present case.

In

that regard, defendants cite the Record at page 548 (Brief of
Respondent at 2-3) to the effect that Evan Pearce's drinking
continued until 9:00 a.m. of the morning of June 1, 1979.

Evan's

drowning occurred sometime between 7:00 p.m. June 1, 1979 and
June 2, 1979.

The Record at page 548 does not support that

conclusion, but only supports the conclusion that Evan Pearce may
have been drinking until 6:00 a.rn. or 6:30 a.m. of June 1, 1979,
some 12 1/2 to 13 hours prior to the earliest possible time of
drowning.

That evidence is remote and not related by other

testimony t6 the time of Evan's death.

Comparisons of varying

degrees of remoteness does not invalidate the clear and logical
import of the Bach case which emphasizes that evidence of the
consumption of alcohol has

~uch

a propensity to prejudice that·

the court must make a special examination of such evidence and
must require appropriate foundational testimony to establish the
probative value thereof.
At trial the defendants did not show or even suggest that
the deceased, Evan Pearce, was under the influence of alcohol at
the time of the accident.

Defendants frankly admitted that they

could not prove any adverse effects on Evan Pearce by any alleged
alcohol consumption.

In spite of this, and in spite of the fact

that any consumption would have occurred substantially before the
accident, thereby making it remote in time, defendants were
int~n£

on

p~esenting

tb the jury evidence which could· only pre-

judice the plaintiff and which was without any probative value.
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Because the evidence was perceived as so damning, it was the
first evidence presented by defendants in their case in chief.
Defendants attempt to sidestep the prejudice issue by
·asserting that since plaintiff did not accept a continuance to
depose defendants' witness who was to introduce the prejudicial
evidence, plaintif.f has waived his right to argue the prejudice
of ·the evidence.

No amount of preparation or foresight could

overcome the damaging effects of the evidence which was introduced concerning Evan Pearce's illegal purchase and consumption
of alcohol.

In view of the predominant community attitudes and

biases against drinking in the community from which the jury was
drawn, and the moral stigma associated with it, the prejudicial
effect of the evidence in question is obvious.
Concededly, the determination as to undue prejudice is one
to be made by the trial court in its sound discretion.

The facts

of the present case show that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion in allowing the admission of the evidence in question.
The admission of the evidence in question, which plaintiff
asserts had a disastrously prejudicial and inflammatory effect
upon the decision of the jury, was reversible error.
POINT III
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 REGARDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT EVAN
PEARCE WAS EXERCISING DUE CARE FOR HIS OWN SAFETY WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Defendants' argument against plaintiff's contention that the
court's failure to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 13
was reversible error consists of an enumeration of several alleged
acts of negligence by the deceased, Evan Pearce.
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(Brief of

Respondents at 11.)
The defendants list seven items of the deceased Evan Pearce's
alleged negligence.

(Brief of Respondents at 11-12).

The first

four items defendants list were acts or circumstances which
occurred prior .to the time of the actual emergency, that is,
prior to the time Kevin Wistisen ran over the ski rope and abandoned the boat in the wind without electrical power and without
anchor.

Therefore, it is impossible to say that, with respect to

the emergency, these acts constituted a failure by Evan Pearce to
exercise due care for his own safety.

In other words, had Kevin

Wistisen not created the emergency in question these prior acts
by Evan Pearce would be completely irrelevant with respect to any

notion that.he was not exercising due care for his own safety.
Defendants' claim that these first four enumerated acts
show that Evan Pearce was not exercising due care for his own
safety suggests a striking analogy to the "thin skull" doctrine.
The core of the doctrine, as set out in 57 Am.Jur 2d, Negligence
§

160, P. 522, is as follows:
[T]he established rule is that where the
result of an accident is to bring into activity a dormant or incipient disease, or one
to which the injured person is predisposed,
the negligence which caused the accident is
the proximate cause of the disability, and if
a latent condition itself does not cause pain
and suffering, but that condition plus an
injury causes such pain and suffering, the
injury, and not the latent condition, is the
proximate cause thereof. Where such a preexisting condition is shown, the rule is that
the negligent actor is subject to liability
for harm to another although a physical
condition of the other which is neither known
nor should be known to the actor makes the
injury greater than that which the actor as a
reasonable man should have foreseen as a
probable result of his conduct. Under this
-9-
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rule, which has sometimes been referred to
as the ''thin skull" doctrine, the tortfeasor
takes his victim as he finds him.
In applying this rule by analogy, it is clear that defendants cannot assert as negligence any acts by Evan Pearce or
conditions from which he suffered, which occurred or existed
before Kevin Wistisen created the emergency by running over the
rope and abandoning the boat.

In essence, it is irrelevant

whether Evan Pearce was tired or in some other condition prior to
the time when Kevin Wistisen created the emergency, because at
the time of the emergency defendants must "take their victim as
they find him."

The only acts by Evan Pearce which defendants

may cite as contributory negligence, and use to oppose the presumption that Evan Pearce used due care for his own safety, would
be acts which occurred after Kevin lJistisen created the emergency.
The last three enumerated acts.by Evan Pearce occurred after.
Kevin Wistisen created the emergency, but are clearly not acts
which a reasonable mind could construe as constituting a failure
to exercise due care for one's own safety.
First, defendants cite the removal of the life jacket by
Evan Pearce in an attempt to reach the boat as a failure to
exercise. due care for his own safety.

On the contrary, this act

constituted a valiant last-ditch effort by one who was intensly
interested in securing his own safety.

Evan Pearce had made

several attempts to swim to the boat with the life jacket on.
The wind was blowing the boat away from him faster than he could
swim with the jacket on.

He therefore made one last calculated

effort to reach the boat without the hindering and obstructing
effect of the jacket.

He swam to the boat without the jacket but
-10-
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even the removal of the jacket did not sufficiently aid him and
he was unable to reach the boat.
Second, defendants cite Evan Pearce's failure to adjust the
life jacket which was thrown out to him as a failure to exercise
due care for his own safety.

Evan Pearce did put the jacket on,

but it was improperly undersized.

·(R. at 517).

Even if it were

to be assumed that the jacket could have been adjusted, it
obviously was not adjustable while the wearer was wearing the
jacket.

To take the jacket off for adjustment would have only

created a potential additional hazard to Evan Pearce's life.
Third, defendants credit the separation of Evan Pearce and
Kevin llistisen as being the sole result of action by Evan Pearce.
Again it must be remembered that these boys were faced with a
dire emergency.

The water in which they were stranded was very

cold and it was getting dark very rapidly.

Evan Pearce's efforts

to reach shore as quickly as possible can only be construed as an
effort to secure his own safety.
Referring again to Haman v. Prudential Insurance Company of
America, 415 P.2d 305, 311 (Idaho 1966); which was cited in
detail in appellant's brief, the court held:
[I]f reasonable minds might differ as to the
conclusions to be drawn from the evidertce
opposing the presumption, the matter should
be submitted to the jury and the jury informed
as to the presumption • • •
(Emphasis added.)
Concededly, whether a prirna facia case opposing the presumption has been made is a question for the Court.

Based on the

facts of the instant case, the extreme emergency faced by Evan
Pearce and the efforts Evan Pearce made to secure his own safety,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the plaintiff asserts that the Court abused its discretion in
ruling that sufficient evidence had been adduced by defendants to
constitute a prima facia case.

Plaintiff's assertion rests on

the ease with which reasonable minds could readily have drawn
conclusions with respect to the actions by Evan Pearce finding
that he was indeed exercising due care for his own safety.
It is abundantly clear from the above analysis that reasonable
minds could have drawn different conclusions from the evidence
defendants adduced at trial in opposition to the presumption.

It

is indeed likely that reasonable minds might conclude that all
actions by Evan Pearce were highly motivated by a desire to
secure and exercise due care for his own safety. Sufficient
evidence to make a prima facia case in opposition to the presumption was not adduced by defendants.

The presumption should,

therefore, have been submitted to the jury and the Court's failure
to do so in this action constitutes reversible error.
POINT IV
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF AN ANCHOR ABOARD THE
BOAT IN ISSUE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Plaintiff presented two theories to the.trial court which he
asserts required the trial court to give an instruction concerning
the requirement of an anchor aboard the boat in question.
Plaintiff's first theory is based upon Utah Code Ann.
§

73-18-8 (1980) and 4 Utah Admin. R. § A60-01-3{3)(b)(l2)(1975),

which state that the boat in question should have been equipped
with "an anchor and line of sufficient weight and length to
securely anchor such vessel."

It was disputed whether the beach-

ability of the boat, under the circumstances present on Utah Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the time of the accident, would subject the boat to compliance
with this requirement.

Plaintiff asserts that defendants' evi-

dence was not sufficient to exempt it from the operation of the
statute and the administrative regulation and, therefore, the
lack of an anchor was negligence.
Plaintiff's second theory is based upon rules and regulations promulgated by the state of Utah, through its Division of
Parks and Recreation.

Plaintiff contends that the rules and

regulations made it "essential" that an anchor be on board the
boat in question and that pursuant to these rules and regulations

the lack of an anchor is evidence of negligence by the defendants.
In otherwords, the requirement of an anchor on board the boat was
a "safety standard," ·the deviation from which constitutes negligence.
Plaintiff relied on the authority in Wheeler v. Jones, 19
Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967), in which the plaintiff sued for
injurie~

which he had received as a result of colliding with a

glass door owned and maintained by defendants.

Plaintiffs were

allowed to enter into evidence FHA regulations on the necessity
of having either safety glass or a horizontal metal bar in the
door.

The Utah Supreme Court allowed the evidence, holding that

it was "one of the standards of the community in determining
whether or not the defendants were negligent."

(Emphasis added).

The court in Wheeler continued by stating:
While it is true that the weight of authority
is against allowing regulations such as those
of FHA to be given in evidence, yet there is
a respectable authority permitting such
evidence to be received~
431 P.2d at 987.
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A trend exists in the law which allows codes or standards of

safety issued or sponsered by governmental bodies to be admitted
into evidence on the issue of negligence.

As evidenced by the

decision in Wheeler, Utah is among the minority that allows such
codes and safety standards to be introduced into evidence.

In the instant case, plaintiff established by introduction
of Exhibit 7, that safety regulations exist in the· state of Utah
which would make an anchor an essential piece of equipment on
board the boat in question.

Based on the authority in Wheeler

and the safety standards promulgated by the Utah Division of
Parks and Recreation, the lack of an anchor on board the boat in
question was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 8 concerned the
specific safety regulations promulgated by the Utah Division of
Parks and Recreation.

Since the safety equipment list was intro-

duced into evidence without objection, it was error for the court
not to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 8 in order to
allow the jury to properly evaluate the evidence.
The court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on
plaintiff's theory that an anchor was required aboard the boat
constitutes prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 on the vicarious
liability of the named defendants for the negligence of Kevin
Wistisen as a minor operator of the boat was not given by the
trial court.

The plaintiff has demonstrated conclusively that no

instruction given by the court, viewed in any light, communicated
the doctrine of imputed liability so that the jury could have
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found defendants liable for the negligence of Kevin Wistisen.
The fact that the jury found negligence on the part of defendants,
absent Plaintiff's Instruction No. 6, does not demonstrate that
the jury imputed the negligence of Kevin Wistisen to them.

Under

the law, U.C.A. 73-18-8, the plaintiff was entitled to this
instruction.
The plaintiff was substantially prejudiced by the erroneous
admission of evidence concerning consumption of alcohol by the
deceased, Evan Pearce.

Defendants introduced evidence at trial

that Evan Pearce illegally purchased and consumed alcohol sometime prior to the accident in issue.

Defendants introduced such

testimony in spite of the fact that they did not, and frankly
admitted that they could not, show that Evan Pearce was intoxicated or in any way affected by consumption of alcohol at the
time af the accident.

Defendants introduced this evidenc~ through

the first witness for the defense for the purpose of adducing
evidence which would prejudice and inflame the jury against Evan
Pearce.

The instant case clearly falls within rule stated in

Bach v. Penn

Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir.

1974), that consumption of alcohol which is remote in time is
irrelevant and that such evidence should be closely scrutinized
to avoid prejudice.

The trial court clearly abused its discre-

tion in allowing the admission of such evidence.
of such evidence was, therefore, reversible

The admission

error~

The majority of the alleged acts of negligence by Evan
Pearce occurred prior to the emergency created by the negligence
of Kevin Wistisen and cannot be cited as comparative negligence
on the part of Evan Pearce.

The acts of Evan Pearce which
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occurred after Kevin Wistisen created the emergency clearly show
efforts of Evan Pearce which were highly motivated by a desire to·
secure his own safety.

The presumption of due care for one's

safety should have been presented to _the jury.

The failur~ of

the trial court to present the presumption was reversible error.
The requested jury instruction concerning the requirement of
an anchor was based upon the statutory requirement of Utah Code
Ann.

§

73-18-8 (1980) and 4 Utah Admin. R.

§

A60-0l-3(3)(b)(l2)

(1975), and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Utah
Division of Parks and Recreation.

The Utah Supreme Court has

held that rules and regulations of this nature are "one of the
standards of the community in determining whether or not the
defendants were negligent."
431 P.2d 985 (1967).

Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392,

Although the plaintiff requested such an

instruction, no instruction given by the court touched on this
requirement that an anchor be on board the boat or that a lack
of an anchor would constitute negligence by the defendants.

The

court's failure to give an appropriate instruction on plaintiff's
theory that an anchor was required aboard the boat constitutes
prejudicial error.
Respectfully submitted this

_t.qf

D.

day of September, 1982.

ID L

·~

HOWARD, LEWIS
Attorneys for
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